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NUNO GAROUPA AND TOM GINSBURG*
Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence
This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing de-
bate about the selection and discipline of judges. In recent decades,
many countries around the world have created judicial councils, insti-
tutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between judicial
independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we
provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify
some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we test the
extent to which different designs of judicial council affect judicial
quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils and
quality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils
nevertheless remain attractive institutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The selection of judges is a central factor in most theories of judi-
cial independence.1 Judges who are dependent in some way upon the
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Law School. We thank Luciana Gross Cunha, Emilio Gerelli, James Gordley, F. An-
drew Hanssen, Richard McAdams, Maria Angela Oliveira, Limor Riza, Larry Solum,
Alexi Trochev, Stefan Van Hemmen, and seminar participants at the American Eco-
nomic Association meetings in Chicago (ISNIE Special Session on the Economics of
the Judiciary), the Taormina International Conference in Searching for New Methods
in Law and Economics, the Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Asso-
ciation meetings in Brasilia, the Royal Economic Society meetings in Coventry, and at
the workshops in UAB Barcelona, University of Illinois College of Law, the University
of Southern California Gould School of Law and the Hamburg Institute of Law and
Economics. We are grateful to Rebecca Crouse, Sofia Garcia, Christopher Minelli, and
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1. There is a large body of literature on judicial independence and quality. See,
e.g., Richard Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Pub-
lic Choice, BYU L. REV., at 827 (1990); Paul Fenn & Eli Salzberger, Judicial
Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831
(1999); F. Andrew Hannsen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Indepen-
dence?, 94 Am. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Irving Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial
Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980); Daniel Klerman & Paul Mahoney, The
Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England, 7 AM. L &
ECON. REV. 1 (2005); William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The
Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); J. Mark Ramseyer &
Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Ja-
pan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997); McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial
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person who appoints them cannot be relied upon to deliver neutral,
legitimate, high-quality decisions. While there is near-universal con-
sensus on this as a matter of theory, legal systems have devised a
wide range of selection mechanisms in practice, often trying to bal-
ance independence with accountability through institutional design.
The diversity of systems of judicial selection suggests that there is no
consensus on the best manner to guarantee independence. 2
At the same time, there is a trend toward insulating judicial se-
lection from partisan politics. In the United States, this is reflected in
the growing scholarly consensus in favor of "merit selection."3 In
other countries, it is reflected in the adoption of judicial councils, an
international "best practice" designed to help ensure judicial indepen-
dence and external accountability. We thus see the emergence of a
new orthodoxy-merit selection is good and other methods are retro-
Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105 (2006); William H. Rehnquist, See in
a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, Wis. L. REV. 1 (1993). For a more
comparative perspective, see Josefina Calca de Temeltas, Commentary: Comparative
Constitutional Approaches to the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence, 40 ST.
Louis U. L. J. 1997 (1996).
2. See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER (Kate Mal-
leson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).
3. Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature,
106 DICKERSON L. REV. 729 (2002) (providing summary of empirical evidence); Luke
Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the New York Court
of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339 (1996) (advocating merit system for New York); Nor-
man L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to Develop a
Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REV.
459 (2005) (merit system superior); Steven Zeidman, Keynote Address, Judicial Polit-
ics: Making the Case for Merit Selection, 68 ALB. L. REV. 713 (2005); Lawrence H.
Avrill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges: A
Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281 (1995) (Arkansas); Sara S.
Greene, et al., On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona's Judicial Merit Selection Sys-
tem: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239 (2007) (Arizona); Victoria
Cecil, Merit Selection and Retention: The Great Compromise? Not Necessarily, 39
COURT REV. 20 (2002) (Florida); Jason J. Czarnezki, Essay, A Call for Change: Im-
proving Judicial Selection Methods, OR. L. REV. 459 (2005) (Wisconsin); Lenore L.
Prather, Judicial Selection: What is Right for Mississippi?, 72 Miss. C.L. REV. 459(2002) (Mississippi); Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status Procedures,
and Issues, 49 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1 (1994) (providing extensive history of merit selec-
tion and arguing for the merit plan); Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial
Nominating Commissions: Independence, Accountability, and Public Support, 34
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 78 (2007); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for
Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 1 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 273 (2002) (arguing for appointment over election); Norman L.
Greene, A Critical Appraisal of Appointive Selection for State Court Judges: The Judi-
cial Independence Through Fair Appointments Act, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13 (2007)
(same); G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 291 (2007) (same); Jeffery D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in
Judicial Selection and Their Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 459 (2007); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (judicial elections
undermine rule of law); Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Prefer-
ences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL.
1206 (1997).
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grade. Because there are few common metrics to evaluate the
comparative independence or quality of judiciaries, the new scholarly
consensus is largely theoretical, built on anecdotal rather than sys-
tematic evidence.4
This Article describes the global spread of judicial councils and
provides a theory of their formation and features. By our estimate,
over sixty percent of countries have some form of judicial council, up
from ten percent thirty years ago. 5 We also provide some evidence as
to whether different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality.
Although we find that there is little relationship between council
adoption and quality, the Article argues that the eternal struggle for
a balance between independence and accountability ensures that ju-
dicial councils will continue to be a locus of institutional reform. Yet
there are limits to the efficacy of institutional solutions to problems of
judicial independence. Although councils serve as an arena for con-
testation for various groups with an interest in judicial performance,
they do not by themselves guarantee the substantive outputs of inde-
pendence and quality.
The Article is organized as follows. First, we discuss the emer-
gence of judicial councils. We then provide a theory of the formation
of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which
they differ. Next, we test the extent to which different designs of judi-
cial council affect judicial quality. We find that there is little
relationship between council design and quality. Our theory never-
theless offers a positive explanation for why judicial councils remain
attractive institutions. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the
implications of the analysis.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE
A long and established literature argues that the ideal of judicial
independence is a crucial quality of legal systems, and indeed inher-
ent in the notion of judging.6 Naturally, the ideal is not always met,
for it remains the case that in every legal system judges are ap-
pointed and employed by the state. It would be unusual indeed if
judges did not have a role in implementing social policy, broadly con-
ceived. 7 In democracies, this implies the need for some accountability
4. But see Stephen J. Choi et al., Judicial Independence, Judicial Quality and
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: An Empirical Test Using Data from State Su-
preme Courts (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.comL/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
998536 (finding that judges in partisan systems are more productive in terms of num-
ber of opinions, but that appointed judges are cited more frequently).
5. Diffusion data on file with authors.
6. See the recent volume JuDciAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTER-
DISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2003).
7. MARTIN SHAPIRO, CouRTs: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
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of judges. While judicial independence is widely studied,8 accounta-
bility has been the subject of much less inquiry. It requires that the
judiciary as a whole maintain some level of responsiveness to society,
as well as a high level of professionalism and quality on the part of its
members. This section discusses judicial councils as devices to ensure
both independence and accountability.
A. Judicial Councils in Civil Law and Common Law Systems
Judicial councils are bodies that are designed to insulate the
functions of appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges from
the partisan political process while ensuring some level of accounta-
bility. Judicial councils lie somewhere in between the polar extremes
of letting judges manage their own affairs and the alternative of com-
plete political control of appointments, promotion, and discipline. The
first model of judicial self-management arguably errs too far on the
side of independence, while pure political control may make judges
too accountable in the sense that they will consider the preferences of
their political principals in the course of deciding specific cases. There
are a wide variety of models of councils, in which the composition and
competences reflect the concern about the judiciary in a specific con-
text, balancing between demands for accountability and
independence.
France established the first High Council of the Judiciary (Con-
seil Superieur de la Magistrature) in 1946.9 It was in charge of
managing judicial personnel but only a minority of members were
8. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying "Independence," 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297
(2006) (identifying formal and informal pressure on the judiciary); Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999)
(explaining judicial independence in contemporary American history); Archibald Cox,
The Independence of Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565
(1996) (discussing historical reasons for judicial independence); John Ferejohn &
Larry Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L.REv. 962 (2002) (arguing that independence and accountability
aim at a well-functioning system of adjudication); John Ferejohn, Judicializing Polit-
ics, Politicizing the Law, 65 LAw & CONT. PROBS. 45 (2002); John Ferejohn,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999) (discussing institutional protections for judges and the judici-
ary and explaining interest theories of judicial independence); Gordon Bermant &
Russell Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and
Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. (1995) (identifying different levels of indepen-
dence, including decisional independence, personal independence, procedural
independence, administrative independence; and different levels of accountability,
namely internal vs. external accountability); Frank Kahn Zemans, The Accountable
Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625-56 (1999) (discuss-
ing institutional versus decisional independence); also Burbank & Friedman, supra
note 6.
9. A precursor for judicial councils can be seen in the use of formal nominations
committees composed of various governmental officials. See, e.g., Constitution of Alba-
nia, 1925 (judicial nominations from special committee of judges, prosecutors, and
Minister of Justice).
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themselves magistrates elected directly by fellow judges.10 Italy's ju-
dicial council (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura), created in
1958, was the first to fully insulate the entire judiciary from political
control, a model that has been followed in other judicial reforms." 1
Spain 12 and Portugal 13 have slightly different models introduced af-
ter the fall of the dictatorships in the mid 1970s, in which judges
constitute a significant proportion of the members. These councils
have final decision-making in all cases of promotion, tenure, and re-
moval. Judicial salaries are also technically within their authority
but usually tempered by the department in charge of the budget (typ-
ically the Ministry of Finance). The power of high-ranking
magistrates has been dramatically reduced in most of these countries
(as a consequence of junior-ranking judges being appointed to the ju-
dicial council) and strong unions or judicial associations have
emerged.14
The French and Italian cases were motivated by a concern about
excessive politicization and consequently granted extensive indepen-
dence to the judicial power. After some time, however, courts became
more extensively involved in politics and accountability issues came
10. In the Fifth Republic, the President of the Republic took over the appoint-
ments of all the members and reinstated most of the traditional powers of the
Minister of Justice and higher-ranking judges. The cohabitation period in the 1980s
eventually led to another reform (Loi Constitutionnelle of July 1993 and Loi Or-
ganique of Feb. 1994). The Council has two committees, one for judges and another
one for prosecutors. The Council has a total of sixteen members. Each committee has
one administrative judge chosen by the administrative judges (Conseil d'Ptat) and
three individuals chosen by the President, the Senate, and the National Assembly
each. For the judicial committee, it has also five judges elected by the fellow judges
and one prosecutor chosen by the fellow prosecutors; for the prosecutorial committee,
it has one judge elected by the fellow judges and five prosecutors for the prosecutorial
formation. The President and the Minister of Justice sit ex officio. See Cheryl Thomas,
Judicial Appointments in Continental Europe, Lord Chancellor's Department, Re-
search Series 6/97, 1997.
11. The Italian Council was made up of thirty-three members, twenty magis-
trates elected directly by the judges, ten lawyers or law professors nominated by the
Parliament, and the President, the Chief-Justice, and the Chief-Prosecutor all serving
ex officio. It has been reformed recently to include only twenty-four members, sixteen
ordinary magistrates and prosecutors and eight lawyers or law professors with fifteen
years experience in the legal profession, all of whom are appointed by the Parliament.
See Thomas, supra note 10.
12. The Spanish Council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) has twenty mem-
bers, twelve judges and eight lawyers all appointed by the Parliament and the Chief-
Justice ex officio. For prosecutors, there is a council made up of twelve prosecutors
(Consejo Fiscal).
13. There are three councils in Portugal, one for judicial courts (Conselho Supe-
rior da Magistratura), one for administrative courts (Conselho Superior dos Tribunais
Administrativos e Fiscais), and one f~r prosecutors (Conselho Superior do Ministgrio
Pdblico).
14. A good summary can be found in Thierry-Serge Renoux, 2000, Les Conseils
Supdrieurs de la Magistrature en Europe, Documentation Fran~aise (Coll. Perspec-
tives sur la justice). About the unionization of the judiciary, see Willem de Haan et al.,
Radical French Judges: Syndicat de la Magistrature, 16 J.L. & Soc'v 477-82 (1989)
(explaining the role of the union of judges).
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to the fore. For example, in France, reforms in the 1990s were clearly
driven by political events that have empowered the judiciary. Al-
though the Fifth Republic maintained the traditional subordination
of the French judiciary to the executive and the legislature, and the
rather docile judiciary exercised individual and collective judicial
self-restraint, conflicts began to develop in the late 1960s and
1970s. 15 The consolidation of judicial review by the Constitutional
Council in the mid-1970s had a major and enduring impact. The
sharp increase in litigation, both civil and administrative, the
criminalization of many activities, and the extension of the scope of
application of the European Convention of Human Rights, all served
to increase the influence of the French judiciary. At the same time,
several political scandals gave the judiciary an important influence
over politics. France, with its tradition of viewing the judiciary as a
faceless collectivity dispensing justice, was now faced with a new
kind of celebrity. 16 Though the judiciary as a whole is still quite self-
restrained, a number of individual judges gained notoriety because of
their role in investigating political scandals. This in turn has led to
the introduction of a debate about the lack of external accountability
of judges. 17
The pattern in Italy is similar. The Italian judicial system is no-
table for its extreme independence, in which the judicial council
controls virtually all aspects of judicial appointment and promotion
for the ordinary judiciary.18 The balance of power on the council is
clearly in the hands of the judiciary, and since the internal hierarchy
of the judiciary has largely been undermined, all decisions on the sta-
tus of magistrates are taken by the council. Prominent scandal
investigations related to businessmen, politicians, and bureaucrats
marked the period from 1992 to 1997, raising questions about judicial
accountability.1 9 Consequently, the composition of the council was al-
tered in 2002 to increase the influence of the Parliament.
15. See Michael. H. Davis, A Government of Judges: An Historical Re-View, 35
AM. J. COMP. L. 559 (1987) (explaining why the American government of judges is
disliked by the French legal scholars); John Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial
Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757 (1988); ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDI-
CIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE (1992); Vincent Wright, The Fifth Republic: From the Droit
d'Etat to the Etat de Droit?, 22 W. EUR. POL. 92 (1999), and Dories Marie Provine &
Antoine Garapon, The Selection of Judges in France: Searching for a New Legitimacy,
in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 176 (Kate Malleson & Peter H.
Russell eds., 2006).
16. See Doris Marie Provine, Courts in the Political Process in France, in COURTS,
LAW AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, at 203-04 (Herbert Jacob et al., eds.,
1996).
17. VALPRY TURCEY, LE CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE FRANCAIS: BI-
LAN ET PERSPECTIVES (2005).
18. See Thomas, supra note 10.
19. Patrizia Pederzoli, The Reform of the Judiciary in ITALIAN POLITICS: QUO
VADIS 153-71 (Carlo Guarnieri & James Newell eds., 2004); David Nelken, The
Judges and Political Corruption in Italy, in THE CORRUPTION OF POLITICS AND THE
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The French-Italian model has been exported to Latin America
and other developing countries. 20 Indeed, the World Bank and other
multilateral donor agencies have made judicial councils part of the
standard package of institutions associated with judicial reform and
rule of law programming. 21 Efforts to produce model "best practices"
have ensured much replication and refinement of the judicial council
model. For example, the Association of European Magistrates for De-
mocracy and Freedom (MEDEL) produced a Draft Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, called the
Elements of European Statute on the Judiciary (known as the "Pa-
lermo Declaration"). This model statute states that there shall be a
supreme council of magistracy, at least half of whom are judges and
also including appointees of the parliament.22 The model statute also
declares that the supreme council will produce a budget for the
courts, manage the administration, and control recruitment, assign-
ment 23 and discipline of judges,2 4 thus guaranteeing judicial
independence. The Council of Europe made a similar recommenda-
POLITICS OF CORRUPTION 95-112 (Michael Levi & David Nelken eds., 1996); Carlo
Guarnieri, Judicial Independence in Latin Countries in Western Europ, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AROUND THE
WORLD (Peter Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001).
20. See, e.g., Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Appointment and Removal Process for
Judges in Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Pro-
moting Judicial Independence, 49 LATIN AMERICAN POL. & Soc. 33 (2005) (Argentina).
Some refer to a distinction between a "Northern European Model" more focused on
management concerns and a "Southern European Model" that is constitutionalized
and focusing on structural independence. Wim Voermans & Pim Albers, Councils for
the Judiciary in EU Countries, European Council for the Efficiency of Justice, CEPEJ
(2003). We reject this distinction as unhelpful, but rather develop an index of powers
and competences discussed infra, section V.
21. See Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Les-
sons from Latin America (Working-Paper Series Democracy and Rule of Law Project
28, 2002). See also Pedro C. Magalhaes, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern
Europe, 32 COMP. POL. 43-62 (1999) (discussing the judicial institutional design in
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland and how it relates to the bargaining process between
the different political actors); ); Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of
the Supreme Court of Mexico, 32 J. LAT. AMER. STUD. 705 (2000) (arguing that specific
constitutional reforms and the politics of co-optation subordinated the judiciary to the
dominant party until 1994); Peter H. Solomon, Putin's Judicial Reform: Making
Judges Accountable as well as Independent, 11 E. EuR. CONST. REV. 117-23 (2002)
(discussing the reforms to the Judicial Qualification Commission); Lauren Castaldi,
Judicial Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal of Venezuelan Judges
and the Complications of Rule of Law Reform, 37 GEORGETOWN J. INT'L L. 477 (2006)
(discussing the current situation in Venezuela).
22. Art. 3.2.
23. Art. 3.1.
24. Subject to review by the Supreme Court. Art. 3.4.
109
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
tion in a document published in 1994.25 Other international
organizations have followed suit.2 6
The motivating concern for adoption of councils in the French-
Italian tradition was ensuring independence of the judiciary after pe-
riods of undemocratic rule. To entrench judicial independence, most
of these countries enshrined the judicial council in their constitution.
Independence, however, is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon.
Even though judges may be independent from political control, they
may become dependent on other forces, such as senior judges in a
judicial hierarchy-with just as much potential to distort individual
decision-making as more conventional political influence. 27 In civil
law countries, in particular, a large proportion of judges are recruited
directly from law school using some form of public examination, with
no or limited requirements of previous professional experience. 28
This model emphasizes socialization within the ranks of the judicial
profession and creates the potential for institutional pressures on
judges to decide individual cases in ways that are at odds with their
own conscience or reading of the law.
Perhaps because of concerns over this structural problem, exter-
nal accountability has emerged as a second goal of councils. This is
exemplified by the judicial councils in some civil law countries, such
as Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, that enjoy fewer compe-
tences than do those in the French-Italian model. These councils are
limited to playing a role in selection (rather than promotion or disci-
pline) of judges, or are heavily influenced by regional and federal
governments. The political impact of these councils on the judiciary
has been less clear than in the four European countries utilizing the
French-Italian model. 29
Consider the Dutch case. Important reforms were recently intro-
duced to ensure more transparency and accountability but were not
due to high profile political scandals. The Dutch judiciary was histori-
cally very restrained, with a tradition of deference and a strong
concept of parliamentary sovereignty. The 1956 constitutional re-
form, designed to accommodate the nascent European legal order,
paved the way for more judicial activism and judges gradually be-
25. Recommendation No.R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges (1994) (Council of Europe
Recommendation), art. I.2.c
26. Violane Autheman & Sandra Elena, Global Best Practices-Judicial Councils:
Lessons Learned from Europe and Latin America, IFES, 2004 (arguing that judicial
councils should be composed of a majority of judges elected by their peers and should
be tasked with selection, promotion, discipline, and training).
27. See Owen Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOC-
RACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55-72 (Irwin Stotzky ed., 1993)(focusing on independence within the judicial hierarchy).
28. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judici-
ary, 7 CHI L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000).
29. See Thomas, supra note 10.
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came more active in enforcing the European Convention of Human
Rights. 30 In 2002, a Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de Recht-
spraak) was created to take primary responsibility for the
organization and financing of the Dutch Judiciary.31 The primary im-
petus for reforms has not been the judicialization of politics but
rather a perceived need for more accountability and better allocation
of resources.
The councils in civil law jurisdictions vary in their relationship
with the Supreme Court. In some countries, such as Costa Rica and
Austria, the judicial council is a subordinate organ of the Supreme
Court tasked with judicial management. 32 In other countries, judicial
councils are independent bodies with constitutional status. Further,
in some countries councils govern the entire judiciary, while in others
they only govern lower courts. 33
The case of Brazil is of special interest in this context. The Bra-
zilian judiciary has traditionally been considerably decentralized,
very much influenced by the United States model. 34 Although there
are serious administrative and financial advantages of decentraliza-
tion, it has also created serious drawbacks in terms of effective
disciplinary action and accountability. Brazil's first judicial council
was created in 1977. The primary function of the council was discipli-
nary and it had no budgetary or administrative functions. Though
formally designed to provide the appearance of independence, the
1977 version of the judicial council did little to constrain potential
military interference with the courts. Indeed, judicial independence
was in one sense greatest between 1988 and 2004, when judges en-joyed a vastly expanded domain of governance but had little
oversight. The association between the council and the dictatorship
was the likely reason for its abolition in 1988 with the return to de-
mocracy. Nevertheless, in 2004, Brazil passed a constitutional
amendment to introduce a new judicial council with a very different
structure from its predecessor. 35 Only with the recent reforms is
30. See THIJMAN KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 76-84 (2003)(describing the growth of power of the Dutch judiciary).
31. The creation of the Council for the Judiciary followed the Leemhuis Commis-
sion's advice to the Minister of Justice by the report "Updating the Administration of
Justice", in 1998.
32. The 1977 Brazilian council (Conselho Nacional da Magistratura) was another
good example. However, the 2004 council (Conselho Nacional de Justiqa) has ninejudges from different courts, including the Chief-Justice ex officio, two prosecutors,
two lawyers (representatives of the bar association) and two laymen appointed by the
Senate and the House respectively.
33. Voermans & Albers, supra note 20, provide the examples of Guatemala and
Argentina.
34. See the discussion by Maria Angela Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Su-
preme Federal Court: A Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV.
99 (2006).
35. The new model includes nine judges, two prosecutors, two lawyers, and two
laymen appointed by the legislature.
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there a promise of a strong but politically accountable judiciary. It
remains, of course, to be seen whether this materializes.
Recruitment of the judiciary in common law countries has tradi-
tionally drawn from more senior lawyers who have a wider range of
previous experience and socialization than do judges in the civil law
jurisdictions.3 6 Therefore, external accountability has been a major
motivating factor in shaping the design of judicial appointment sys-
tems. Compared to the civil law judiciaries, common law judges have
relatively few opportunities for advancement, and hence there is less
capacity for political authorities to use the promise of higher office to
influence judicial decision-making.3 7 Accordingly, appointments
processes have received serious attention since judges are fairly im-
mune from pressures once appointed. In the United Kingdom, the
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 has created the Judicial Appoint-
ments Commission responsible for appointments based solely on
merit.38 There is nevertheless a good deal of discussion as to how to
balance the merit principle with other functionalist goals such as af-
firmative action and the Commission is anticipated to be able to
produce a judiciary that is both higher quality and more diverse. 39
36. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 28. Debate in common law countries tends to
focus on the merits of the appointees and diversity concerns. See, e.g., Kate Malleson,
Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and Human Rights, in Building the UK's
New Supreme Court, in NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Andrew Le Sueur
ed., 2004).
37. CfJ. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
(2004) (documenting political manipulation of judicial career structures in Japan).
However, see David M. O'Brien & Yasou Ohkoshi, Shifting Judicial Independence
from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DE-
MOCRACY, CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD (Peter Russell & David M.
O'Brien eds., 2001) (arguing that Ramseyer and Rasmusen have misunderstood the
manipulation of the judiciary in Japan as political by the LDP when it is merely bu-
reaucratic by the faceless General Secretariat of the Supreme Court).
38. The composition of the JAC is fifteen, seven are judges and magistrates, two
lawyers (one barrister and one solicitor), and six are laymen (including the chairman).
It started selecting judges in Apr. 2006. KATE MALLESON, THE LEGAL SYSTEM ch. 17.40
(2005), argues that the JAC is effectively dominated by the judiciary. The fact that the
council is chaired by a non-lawyer does not seem to counter a strong judicial member-
ship. The traditional role of the Lord Chancellor in judicial appointments has been
the object of study by Anthony Bradney, THE JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE LORD CHAN-
CELLOR 1946-1987: A PELLET, 16 J.L. & Soc'y 360 (1989).
39. For a discussion on the extent to which merit selection is consistent with af-
firmative action in the judiciary, see Kate Malleson, Rethinking the Merit Principle in
Judicial Selection, 33 J.L. & Soc'Y 126-40 (2006); see also Kathleen A. Bratton &
Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of Appointment
Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOCIAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY 504 (2002) (presenting empirical evidence that appointed systems of judi-
cial selection produce more diversity than election systems). The Canadian experience
of provincial and federal advisory committees has been appraised as a good model to
promote women and minorities within the judiciary. There are wide different models
in Canada, but usually judges are not a majority in the council. The federal committee
has seven members, three laymen, three lawyers, and one judge. See Kate Malleson,
The Use of Judicial Appointment Commissions: A Review of the US and Canadian
Models, Lord Chancellor's Department, Research Series 6/97, 1997.
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The advantages of a Judicial Appointment Commission have also
been at the heart of the debate in New Zealand and in Australia,
where judicial appointments are still in the competence of the Attor-
ney-General. Currently, judicial appointment protocols have been
developed to enhance independence and external accountability (by
including mandatory consultation with several office holders).40
Within the common law world, the case of Singapore is also an
interesting one that illustrates the dangers of assuming that judicial
involvement in appointments ensures complete independence. There
is a Legal Service Commission in Singapore, but its role is somewhat
limited.4 1 The president appoints judges of the Supreme Court on the
recommendation of the prime minister after consultation with the
Chief Justice. The Legal Service Commission supervises and assigns
the placement of the subordinate court judges and magistrates who
have the status of civil servants; however, the president appoints
subordinate court judges on the recommendation of the Chief Jus-
tice. 42 The Chief Justice in Singapore is probably the most well-paid
judge in the world, with a salary of well over one million U.S. dollars,
and the judiciary is widely praised for its quality and independence.
Nevertheless, it is also known for its docility in cases of great impor-
tance to the ruling party. One might characterize this situation as
being one in which the bribes are legalized in the form of salaries,
and in which the person of the Chief Justice operates to ensure that
lower judges do not stray from the formula of independence in com-
mercial cases but docility in political ones.4 3
B. The American Experience
In many American states, concern over traditional methods of ju-
dicial selection (either appointment by politicians or direct election by
the public) led to the adoption of "Merit Commissions" to remove par-
tisan politics from judicial appointments and base selection on merit.
40. Empirical analysis is provided by Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, 30
THE DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, J. LEGAL STUD. 223-52 (2001) and Pushkar Mai-
tra & Russell Smyth, Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the Enforcement
of Legislative Wealth Transfers - An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court,
EUR. J.L. & ECON., at 17 (2004). See also discussion by John M Williams, Judicial
Independence in Australia, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY,
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD ( Peter Russell & David M. O'Brien eds.,
2001) (showing that while the structural guarantees are quite robust and few at-
tempts have made to remove judges, there are serious proposals for reform).
41. See Kim Teck Kim Seah, The Origins and Present Constitutional Position of
Singapore's Legal Service Commission, SING. ACAD. L.J., at 2 (1990).
42. The judicial branch of the Legal Service Commission is headed by the Regis-
trar of the Supreme Court but the ultimate responsibility for managing lies with the
Chief Justice.
43. Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter, in
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg &
Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
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Merit Commissions can be seen as analogous to judicial councils,
though their scope of activity is more limited. Because in common law
systems, the judiciary is not a "career judiciary" in the civil law sense,
there is less interest in having independent commissions handle dis-
cipline, promotions, and reassignments, and greater emphasis on
initial appointments. The basic institutional design, however-
namely setting up non-partisan mixed bodies to screen and select ju-
dicial candidates-is similar to the judicial commission.
Sometimes called the "Missouri Plan" (although some assert that
it was first adopted in California) or "Merit Plan," this system fea-
tures a non-partisan judicial selection commission composed of
judges, lawyers, and political appointees. 4 4 The inspiration for this
institution was a famous 1906 speech by Roscoe Pound and can be
seen as consistent with early twentieth century view in the value of
technocracy and administrative insulation from politics. 4 5 The Merit
Commission is responsible for nominating judges, exclusively in some
states and in other states sending a set of candidates from which the
Governor chooses appointees. Merit Plan judges are typically subject
to uncontested retention elections but judges rarely lose these elec-
tions.46 As of 1990, twenty-three states used the Merit Plan for initial
appointment. Most states adopted these institutions in the 1960s and
1970s.47
A general assumption in the literature is that Merit Plan sys-
tems will expand independence. 48 For example, Hanssen tests the
effect of partisan division on appointment and retention systems, as-
suming that Merit Plan correlates with independence. 4 9 He finds
that, broadly speaking, states using merit plans tend to correlate
with higher levels of political competition (and hence presumed de-
mand for judicial independence) than those using partisan
elections.5 0 Hanssen also finds that states switch to merit plans when
they have increased party competition and policy differences between
44. In Missouri, the Commission has seven members: the Chief Justice, three
lawyers elected by the bar from different appellate districts, and three laypersons
appointed by the Governor. For an analysis, see Hanssen, supra note 1.
45. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration
of Justice, 20 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 178 (1937).
46. Peter Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There one Best Method?,
23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1995); Reddick, supra note 3, at 10 (noting only thirty-three
judges lost retention elections in the entire United States between 1942 and 1978).
47. F. Andrew Hannsen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional
Change in State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431-62 (2004).
48. See, e.g., Reddick, supra note 3 (reviewing literature).
49. Hanssen, supra note 1, at 721.
50. For at least one indicator, both these methods have less political competition
on some indicators than the residual category of "other" appointment methods (such
as legislative or gubernatorial appointment. Id. at 720 ("In 95 percent of partisan
election states the same party controlled both houses of the legislature, versus in 87
percent of merit plan states and 81 percent of other states").
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parties. This is consistent with literature that emphasizes the role of
partisan competition in incentivizing judicial independence. 5 1
Nevertheless, we know of no study that has demonstrated an ac-
tual improvement in judicial independence or quality after adoption
of the Merit Plan, and the actual impact on quality is debatable. 52 In
a comprehensive review of the social scientific literature, Reddick
concludes that there is little support for "proponents' claims that
merit selection insulates judicial selection from political forces,
makes judges accountable to the public, and identifies judges who are
substantially different from judges chosen through other systems."53
However, as Hanssen put it "(t)here is today a strong consensus that,
of all the procedures, the merit plan best insulates the state judiciary
from partisan political pressure."5
4
The nominating commission under the Merit Plan is essentially
a judicial council by another name, with its function limited to selec-
tion of judges. As a common law country with judges that tend to be
appointed relatively late in life, the United States has little need for
independent bodies to engage in promotion of judges. Thus the com-
missions play a relatively limited role, but focus on the crucial locus
of partisan pressure. This illustrates the importance of understand-
ing institutional variation in conditioning demand for the judicial
council model.
C. The British Experience
The British case is of particular significance given its recent reforms
to a venerable system. In 2003, Prime Minister Blair's Government
announced its intention to modify the system for judicial appoint-
ments in England and Wales. The reform was justified as advancing
the twin goals of improving judicial independence and enhancing ac-
countability and public confidence. Although the independence of the
judiciary was confirmed in the Act of Settlement 1701, and since then
strong norms of judicial immunity have made it quite difficult to re-
move judges, appointments remained in the hands of the Lord
Chancellor, a senior government official.5 5 The traditional view was
51. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEG. STUD.
721 (1994); see also Tom Ginsburg, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (2003);
Mathew Stephenson, When the Devil Turns... The Political Foundations of Indepen-
dent Judicial Review 32 J. LEG. STUD. 59 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., Selecting Selection
Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY AP-
PROACH 191-226 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, eds., 2002).
52. Webster, supra note 46; Henry Glick, The Promise and Performance of the
Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 519 (1978).
See further discussion in Choi et al., supra note 4.
53. Reddick, supra note 3, at 15 of manuscript.
54. Hanssen, supra note 47, at 452.
55. For example, Stevens mentions several important episodes of political inter-
ference with the judiciary (including the right of the Crown not to reappoint judges on
the change of a monarch) but notes the declining role of the judiciary until the 1960s.
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that the Lord Chancellor was the judiciary's representative in the
government and the government's representative to the judiciary,
hence a unique office well placed to represent the view of each side.56
The English judiciary was never perceived to be a separate branch of
government in the American sense.57 Furthermore, a system depen-
dent on the Lord Chancellor created a unified and hierarchical
judiciary. This structure did not promote diversity of opinions since
someone who did not conform to the views of the establishment was
not likely to be chosen by the Lord Chancellor for a judicial post.
The increasing profile of the English judiciary in recent years has
led to pressures for more judicial accountability. The Pinochet case in
1999 raised serious questions about having the most senior judiciary
sitting at the House of Lords. 58 There have been conflicts over sen-
tencing in the aftermath of the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, the
case of McGonnell v. UK (2000) in the European Court of Human
Rights concerning the office of bailiff of the island of Guernsey had an
important impact. 59 In that case, the Court decided that a single offi-
cial who serves as both a judge and in an administrative role violates
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (although in
practice, in England and Wales, the Lord Chancellor has tradition-
ally avoided sitting on cases where there might be a conflict of
interest). Another source of pressure for more accountability has been
the growth of judicial review and the perception that judicial interfer-
ence has increased significantly. 60
One important concern is the lack of minorities and women in
the bench, thus providing a sense of gender and racial bias in the
appointments mechanism. Some have expressed concern that a small
He argues that the development of high formalism that protected the English judici-
ary from possible political interference made the judiciary increasingly irrelevant. See
ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION
(2005), chs. 1 and 2. See also the recent volume BUILDING THE UK's SUPREME COURT:
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Andrew Le Seur ed., 2004).
56. See J. Steyn, The Case for a Supreme Court, 118 L. Q. R. 382 (contesting this
view and emphasizing that in practice the Lord Chancellor delegates to the Law
Lords judicial business).
57. See J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (5th ed. 1999), at chs. 8
and 9, where he argues that the myth of neutrality has undermined the building-up of
a strong judiciary. The author defends a political role of the judiciary in areas such as
law and order or social issues. See also Stevens, supra note 55, at chs. 6 and 7, and
ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH (1990).
58. The contradictory decisions taken by different panels of three Law Lords were
not easily understood by the public. For a detailed account, see Stevens, supra note
55, at ch. 8.
59. McGonnell v. UK (2000) 30 EHRR 289.
60. See, among others, Robert Stevens, A Loss of Innocence? Judicial Indepen-
dence and the Separation of Powers, 19 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 365 (1999) and Matthew
Flinders, Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in British Central Government, 54
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 54 (2001).
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clique from Oxford and Cambridge dominates the appointments. 61
Furthermore, there have been indications of personal and corporate
bias in judicial profiles. 62 The demands for more diversity in the judi-
ciary called for a new method of judicial selection.
In 2003, Prime Minister Blair's Government announced its in-
tention to change the system for making appointments to the
judiciary in England and Wales. 63 The Constitutional Reform Act
2005 introduced several substantive changes in England and Wales,
including a statutory duty on government members not to influence
judicial decisions. The most far-reaching reforms were the abolish-
ment of the Lord Chancellor with the transfer of his judicial functions
(as the most senior judge in England and Wales) to the President of
the Courts of England and Wales (formerly known as Lord Chief Jus-
tice of England and Wales), 64 and the creation of a new Supreme
Court, with twelve judges independent of and removed from the
House of Lords with their own independent appointment system.65
And crucially, a Judicial Appointments Commission was created, re-
sponsible for recommending candidates for judicial appointments on
a more transparent basis and based solely on merit.
D. Balancing Independence and Accountability
This brief survey illustrates that it is clearly impossible to elimi-
nate political pressure on the judiciary. While adequate institutions
might enhance judicial independence and minimize the problems of a
politicized judiciary, increasing the powers and independence enjoyed
by judges risks creating the opposite problem of over-judicializing
public policy. 66 It is our view that the periodic reforms of judicial ap-
pointments and management that we observe within and across
61. For an empirical analysis, see Jordi Blanes & Clare Leaver, An Economic
Analysis of Judicial Diversity Part I: Judicial Promotions, Oxford University mimeo-
graph (2007). See also Griffith, supra note 57, at 18-21 and Herbert M. Kritzer,
Courts, Justice and Politics in England, in COURTS, LAW AND POLITICS IN COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE 91, at 92 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
62. See GRIFFITH, supra note 57, at chs. 3 to 6.
63. In the case of Scotland, judicial appointments were under review since Sept.
1999 and an independent Judicial Appointments Board was established in June 2002.
64. The President of the Courts of England and Wales sits in the Court of Appeal,
the High Court and the Crown Court, among others, is responsible for expressing the
views of the judiciary and for welfare, training, and guidance of the English judiciary.
He is not the President of the Supreme Court.
65. The new Supreme Court is to be launched in 2008 with the current twelve
Law Lords (the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary). There will be a Supreme Court ad hoc
selection committee presided by the President of the Supreme Court for future ap-
pointments. The remaining Lords of Appeal who are members of the House of Lords
and eligible to hear and decide judicial business under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act
1876 will not be moved to the Supreme Court (in Jan. 2007, there were thirteen in-
cluding three former Lord Chancellors).
66. Stephen Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Inter-
branch Relations (U. Pa. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 102, 2006), available at http://lsr.
nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/102 (arguing that judicial independence in the United
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countries reflect a dialectic tension between the need to de-politicize
the judiciary and the trend toward judicializing politics. Indepen-
dence is needed to provide the benefits of judicial decision-making;
once given independence, judges are useful for resolving a wider
range of more important disputes; but as more and more tasks are
given to the judiciary, there is pressure for greater accountability be-
cause the judiciary takes over more functions from democratic
processes.
Figure 1 presents a stylized summary of the recurrent calibra-
tion between independence and external accountability, synthesizing
the different experiences discussed above. Begin in the upper right
corner, a judiciary that has little independence or influence. When
judges carry little weight over public policy and politics, concerns
over independence tend to dominate and reformers may push for a
move from a politically dependent weak judiciary to a strong self-reg-
ulated judiciary (e.g., the French-Italian experience in the 1950s, or
Spain and Portugal in the 1970s). This shift gives rise to a judiciary
that has some control over its own affairs. Frequently, though not
inevitably, judges use this independence to increase their influence
over public policy (perhaps as a result of exogenous events). This is
represented by a shift to the lower left corner of Figure 1. However,
once politics is judicialized in a significant way, pressures arise for
greater political accountability. The judiciary remains strong but is
more subject to oversight and control. As accountability becomes di-
rected only to a small group of principals and assaults on judicial
independence are too successful, we may in some circumstances ob-
serve a move from a politically accountable strong judiciary back to
politically dependent weak judiciary, as in a rising authoritarian re-
gime. This dynamic framework provides a tool for understanding the
various institutional adjustments observed in different countries.
Note that we are not asserting that movement across the various
zones of the figure is inevitable. Institutional configurations can be
stable for long periods of time, and there is no necessary condition
that judiciaries shift their location in the figure. What we believe the
figure does capture, however, is the potential for cycling among dif-
ferent models of judicial governance and the nature of the pressures
that judiciaries will face in particular configurations. We return to
these dynamics later in this Article.
States is at a tipping point because of a characterization of judicial politics as ordi-
nary politics).
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III. WHAT DO COUNCILS Do?
A. Competences
Academic work on judicial councils has been so far quite limited.
There are very few empirical studies 67 and there has been no eco-
nomic or statistical analysis to date that we know of. We have
observed that judicial councils operate in very different legal environ-
ments and, therefore, we need to understand the particularities
before we can compare the role and the powers of judicial councils
across countries.
Broadly speaking, judicial councils have three important
competences:
(i) Housekeeping functions (managing budget, material re-
sources, operations);
(ii) Appointment of judges; and
(iii) Performance evaluation (promotion, discipline, removal and
retention of judges, and judicial salaries).
For all of these functions, the key factor is effective calibration be-
tween judicial independence and external accountability. This
calibration will be achieved, for example, by the composition or mem-
bership of the council, by the appointment mechanism, or by sharing
certain functions with other branches of the government or other bod-
ies (even the public in the case of elected judges). We do not assert
that there is a universally optimal balance between independence
67. But see Hammergren, supra note 21.
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and accountability, but understand that there is a limit to how far
one can move in either direction within democracies. 68 Moving too far
in either direction may trigger pressures for a shift as idealized in
Figure 1.
Whereas the first competence, housekeeping, is purely manage-
rial, the second and third competences are related to career
incentives and more directly contribute to judicial quality. House-
keeping functions deal with practical questions concerning the
organization and the running of the judiciary.69 These functions can,
of course, potentially affect judicial independence-for example, if
material incentives are used to reward certain types of judges. Obvi-
ously managerial competences are also important for the efficiency of
courts and, in that respect, shape the quality of the legal system.
Nevertheless, the other two competences (appointment and perform-
ance evaluation) are more directly related to judicial career
incentives. If institutions matter for judicial quality, they matter be-
cause of their impact on judicial incentives.
B. Composition
Councils also vary in composition. The council is composed of
three possible types of members, (i) judges, (ii) members of other gov-
ernment bodies or their appointees, and (iii) lawyers. Judges on the
Council are typically appointed by the Supreme Court or by other
courts, while lawyers are appointed by the law society/bar associa-
tion. Members of government bodies are typically appointed by their
organizations.
A general assumption in the literature is that a judicial majority
on the council will ensure independence. However, even when the
judges are not a numerical majority in the council, they might have a
dominant or preponderant role for three reasons. First, most mem-
bers of a judicial council must rely on information provided by the
judiciary itself. Second, a judicial council does not exert direct control
over the judiciary (which would hurt the independence of judiciary)
but exercises a configuration of powers that mix authority and ac-
countability. This configuration is usually complex and full of
uncertainties that usually call for expertise by judges. Third, judges
may have particularly strong incentives to represent judicial inter-
ests on the council: after their service on the council, judges will
return to their professional careers inside the judiciary whereas the
non-judges will go back to their careers outside of the judiciary,
68. Hanssen, supra note 1.
69. We believe the primary rationale to be considered in assigning the task to a
council is economies of scale and specialization vis-a-vis alternative managers, such
as the Ministry of Justice (arguably better able to do things like purchasing supplies
etc.) or the Supreme Court (a body that typically has little time or expertise for
management).
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which may or may not have any relationship with judicial manage-
ment issues.
C. The Interaction of Competence and Composition
We are particularly interested in whether composition correlates
with powers. One hypothesis is that judges will resist external regu-
lation and control. Therefore if non-judges are the majority on the
council, we might observe that the Council is given less substantive
powers, but when judges are the majority, powers are high. A compet-
ing hypothesis is that judicial councils (a relatively late historical
development) have been set up to control judges and ensure account-
ability. If this were the case, we should see the percent of judges on
the council negatively correlated with the extent of powers. 70
We can frame this as the question of whether judicial councils
are set up to ensure independence of judges from the principals or
accountability to the principals (see Figure 1). If judges are a majority
on the council, the assumption is that judges utilize the council to
exercise self-government and maintain independence. If judges are a
minority on the council, the assumption is that the council is a device
to constrain the judges and render them more accountable. These two
types of councils reflect quite different goals. 71
To summarize, judicial councils will vary in terms of their compe-
tencies and their structures. Interacting competences with
composition, we can imagine different configurations. We view exten-
sive competence of a judicial council as enhancing judicial
accountability. We follow the conventional wisdom that assumes that
judicial majorities on the judicial council promote independence. In-
teracting these two dimensions, we can see that there are several
possible configurations (see Figure 2). Extensive competences create
strong councils whereas those limited to housekeeping functions are
considered weak councils. Judicial dominance of the council means
that they are less likely to be politicized. Nevertheless, the shape of
the council will depend on whether or not the judges in the council
behave as a homogeneous body. That is easily achieved when judges
come from superior courts since these judges will tend to reinforce
the judicial hierarchy. If the judges come from various different
courts, there may be intra-judicial politics that prevent the judiciary
from acting in unified fashion: we may sometime observe the emer-
70. On the other hand, the politics of setting up the councils may vary greatly
depending on local circumstances, in particular the historical balance of power be-
tween government and Supreme Court. For example, the extent to which the justices
are easily captured by the government will result in different models of judicial
council.
71. Hanssen's data from the United States suggests that the timing of the adop-
tion of council-type mechanisms reflects these motivations.
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gence of judicial associations or unions that provide a solution to
collective action problems.
Figure 2 displays the various models, along with some examples
of their operation.
FIGURE 2: COMPETENCE AND COMPOSITION: TYPOLOGY OF JUDICIAL
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This discussion suggests that councils are not all of a same type. Lo-
cal institutional problems, represented by the location in Figure 1,
will produce pressures for different types of councils in different cir-
cumstances. Even within a country, we may see variation over time
as different institutional problems arise.
IV. EMPIRICAL DATA ON COUNCILS
We have developed a small database on Judicial Councils (see
Appendix). The sample consists of the councils in 121 different na-
tion-states. Data was gathered for the most recent iteration of the
judicial council available. For ninety-three countries, the Judicial
Council is mentioned and described in the country's constitution, so
we gathered our information from there. 72 For twenty-eight other
countries, the Judicial Council is not mentioned in the Constitution,
or it provides no detail on the composition and powers of the Judicial
Council. In these countries, the Judicial Council is left to ordinary
72. This data is from the Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of
Illinois; available at www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org
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law. We gathered data on these countries from an array of sources,
including the 2002 study of Hammergren 73 and a number of country-
specific sources. Figures 3a and 3b provide some indication of the
trends over time and space.
FIGURE 3A: CONSTITUTIONALIZED JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS OVER TIME
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Source: University of
www.constitutionmaking.org
Year
Illinois Comparative Constitutions Project,
Note that the issue of whether or not a council is constitutional-
ized is itself interesting. If the composition and powers of the council
are left to ordinary law, they are subject to enhanced manipulation
by the government and other actors and hence less of a guarantee of
independence. Presumably those councils lean more toward the ac-
countability pole than the independence pole. Conversely, when the
council structure is entrenched in the constitution, it is beyond the
reach of ordinary politics and hence likely to reflect a desire for
greater levels of judicial independence and insulation. In the results
that follow, we predict and find systematically lower independence
scores for countries with non-constitutionalized councils.7 4
73. Hammergren, supra note 21.
74. Judicial independence on every measure is lower for these countries. Coun-
tries with constitutionalized judicial councils have a mean De Facto Independence
(Voigt) score of .51, while those with nonconstitutionalized councils have score .41,
though the n is too low to determine a significant difference in means. Using Howard
and Carey's measure ofjudicial independence, the means are .47 and. 16 respectively,
significant at the .01 level.
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FIGURE 3B: CONSTITUTIONALIZED JUDICIAL COMMISIONS BY
REGION IN 2000
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First, we developed a simple ordinal index of powers/compe-
tences ("<Power Index"). Each judicial council was rated depending on
the extent of its competences. A council that had purely administra-
tive or housekeeping functions council was coded as 1; a council with
a role in appointment, transfer, and discipline of judges was rated a
3. The intermediate rating of 2 was given to councils that had a lim-
ited role either because they could appoint but not discipline judges,
or their role was limited in performance-relevant variables. For ex-
ample, a council that only had a role in recommending judges for
appointment or minimal role in discipline would be rated a 2. We also
include information on countries without judicial councils, an impor-
tant control group. These are denoted by power index 0. A complete
coding of countries with judicial councils is in the Appendix.
Our first prediction was that competences would vary systemati-
cally depending on the institutional problem that is faced. Extensive
competences correlate with stronger councils. Stronger councils, how-
ever, can reflect demands for strong political control and
accountability-or judicial self-regulation effectuated by capture of
the council. Sorting out which motivation exists in particular con-
texts is difficult. To evaluate this issue, we use the working
assumption that a majority of judges on the council indicates a
greater degree of judicial self-regulation.
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A. Power of Judges and Institutional Structure
When judges have extensive powers, judicialization of public pol-
icy is likely to follow. In such environments the judicial council may
reflect demands for control and accountability. We expect this will be
more likely in common law countries as well as any country in which
ordinary judges can engage in the power of judicial review. By con-
trast, where judicial review is limited to a specially designated
constitutional court, we do not expect to observe the same level of
demand for accountability of the ordinary judiciary, of the type asso-
ciated with judicial councils. This is because the major issues of social
policy will more likely be constitutionalized, so the constitutional
court will insulate the ordinary judiciary from politicization, to some
degree.
We find only partial support for these conjectures in the descrip-
tive data. Where judicial review is conducted by ordinary courts,
competences are less likely to be extensive. In general, common law
judicial councils are more likely to have extensive powers, not less.
On the other hand, both common law systems and those in which
ordinary courts have the power of judicial review are less likely to
have a majority of judges on the council, indicating some desire for
external control of judges. (Note that the last column ofFigure 4 is
based on a smaller sample of countries because data on Council com-
position was unavailable for some systems.)
FIGURE 4: JUDICIAL POWERS, COUNCIL COMPETENCE
AND COMPOSITION
Feature of Court Judicial Majority
System Judicial Council Power Index on Council?
1 2 3
Judicial Review by 9% 44% 47% 40%
ordinary courts?
Common Law? 8% 34% 58% 42%
To understand the relationship between composition and compe-
tence, we divide our sample into three groups using to the power
index. We then examine whether an assignment of more extensive
powers is associated with a higher percentage of judges on the coun-
cil. Our results exclude cases for which all information is not
available; this leaves seventy-four cases. In addition, we can ignore
the small number of councils with purely managerial functions.
Councils with the full array of powers have, at the mean, a (bare)
majority of judges; councils with reduced powers have a minority of
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judges.7 5 Using the median rather than mean levels illustrates the
difference more starkly: the median council with the full array of
powers has sixty percent judges; the median council with reduced
powers has twenty-nine percent judges.
FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF JUDGES ON COUNCIL, BY POWER INDEX
Power index Mean % of judges N Std. Deviation
1 .75 5 .28
2 .39 31 .32
3 .50 38 .29
Total .47 74 .31
In short, powers and composition go together, but in two differ-
ent configurations. When councils are very weak (power index 1),
judicial involvement is extensive. When powers are extensive (power
index 3), judicial involvement is also relatively high. In the interme-
diate situation, judicial involvement is lower. We interpret this
finding as reflecting the upper right and lower left quadrants of Fig-
ure 1. Judicial involvement can be extensive when it does not matter
much; but it can also reflect a very powerful and independent judici-
ary that is extensively involved in politics.
B. Regime Type
It is possible that regime type can play some role in sorting out
the various configurations we observe. We predict that autocracies
will feature councils with weak competences (ineffectual council) or
strong competences/fewer judges (for greater political control).76 For
democracies, we predict greater variety, depending on other elements
of the institutional configuration. To explore this, we divide constitu-
tions containing provisions on judicial councils into three categories:
those that are written in autocracies, those written in established de-
mocracies, and those written in transitions between autocracy and
democracy. 77 We use data available from political scientist Carles
Boix, who uses other generally available data to make binary charac-
terizations of countries as autocracies or democracies in a large time-
series.78 We find that the percentage of judges tends to be lower in
75. A difference of means test gives a t-stat of -1.48 (85% confidence level), indi-
cating close to statistical significance.
76. Logit regression confirms the direction of this relationship, although not at
statistically significant levels.
77. There are no cases in our sample of democracies transitioning to autocracies.
78. CARLES Boix, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION (2000); Carles Boix, Constitu-
tions and Democratic Breakdowns, paper presented at Comparative Law and
Economics Forum, Chicago (Oct. 2005). For each constitution, the country's autocracy/
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autocracies rather than democracies, although t-tests indicate the
difference of means is not quite significant. Still, the crude data indi-
cates a mild tendency of autocracies to distrust judges.
FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF JUDGES ON COUNCIL, BY REGIME TYPE
Regime type Mean % of judges N Std. Deviation
Autocracy .38 29 .30
New Democracy .48 25 .33
Established democracy .47 30 .30
Total .43 84 .32
C. Councils and Independence
Finally, we wish to examine whether the variables of composition
and competence correlate with variables such as judicial quality and
independence. This is an important question given that judicial coun-
cils are offered as a "best practice" to promote judicial independence.
As an initial step, we use the Judicial Independence scores produced
by Howard and Carey (2004).79 They analyzed the U.S. Department
of State's Annual Human Rights Reports for a series of years in the
1990s to produce dummy variables for individual, collective, and
overall judicial independence. We used the last year available (typi-
cally 1999).80
Here again we see a trend toward more independence with
greater competences of the judicial council, suggesting that perhaps
councils do increase independence as their proponents assert. There
is a potential problem, however: any index that draws on formal
structures for the definition of judicial independence raises en-
dogeneity problems. It is possible, for example, that the State
Department's assessment is itself affected by whether or not a coun-
try has a judicial council. To overcome this problem, we need to
examine judicial independence as exists on the ground, rather than
relying on formal or structural independence. While this is somewhat
difficult to assess, we are fortunate that Professor Voigt and his co-
authors have developed separate indices for de facto and de jure inde-
democracy status was considered for the five years preceding the constitution and
immediately afterwards. If the country was rated a democracy in the year of or imme-
diately following the promulgation of the constitution, and had been an autocracy at
any time in the five preceding years without an intervening constitution, it was con-
sidered to have undergone a transition from autocracy to democracy.
79. Robert Howard & Henry A. Carey, Courts and Political Freedom: A Measure
of Judicial Independence, 87 JUDICATURE 285 (2004).
80. We focus on their "individual independence" score, which exhibits much more
variance than their collective independence indicator.
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FIGURE 7: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (HOWARD-CAREY "INDIVIDUAL
INDEPENDENCE"), BY POWER INDEX
Power index Mean N Std. Deviation
1 .57 7 .53
2 .55 40 .50
3 .67 51 .47
Total .61 98 .49
pendence. 8' Voigt's de facto index is composed of a number of
variables that are likely to impact actual levels of independence, such
as the number of times rules governing appointment or court struc-
ture have changed, whether judicial budgets and income have
remained constant, whether judges have been removed from office,
and instances of non-implementation of judicial decisions. Using this
more refined index, it does not appear obvious that de facto judicial
independence scores increase with the level of powers for the judicial
council.
FIGURE 8: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE DE FACTO (VoIGT), BY
POWER INDEX
Power index Mean N Std. Deviation
1 .56 5 .24
2 .51 15 .25
3 .50 26 .23
Total .51 46 .23
We also can consider the effect of various features of judicial
councils on metrics of judicial independence. Figure 9 presents four
models using different dependent variables measuring different as-
pects of judicial independence and quality. In each case, we examine
the effects of two different features of judicial councils widely be-
lieved to enhance independence: strong powers and a majority of
judges on the council. In no case do either of these indicators ap-
proach statistical significance when controlling for common law and
GDP. These results are robust to alternative specifications when each
81. Lars Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence:
Cross-Country Evidence Using a new set of Indicators, 19(3) EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497-
527 (2003); Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining De Facto Judicial Independence,
Marburg Papers on Economics No. 07-2005 (2005), available at http://www.uni-mar-
burg.de/fb02/makro/forschunggelbereihe/artikel/2005-07-hayo.pdf (last visited Aug.
10, 2007).
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feature is included on its own. We find no evidence in support of the
presumed relationship between council structure and judicial inde-
pendence or quality.
A final bit of evidence comes from preliminary analysis of World
Bank Rule of Law data on those countries which appear to have
adopted a judicial council after 1996. This data shows that more
countries suffered a decline in quality of rule of law than an increase.
Thirty-nine countries suffered a decline in Rule of Law rating be-
tween adoption and 2005, whereas only twenty-seven countries
showed an increase.8 2 It seems that the emergence of judicial councils
as an international "best practice" for promoting judicial indepen-
dence and quality may be unjustified.
FIGURE 9: COUNCIL FEATURES AS PREDICTORS OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
De Facto
Rule of Law Judicial Judicial Judicial Quality/
Dependent Variable Index 8 3  Independence 8 4 Independence 8 5  Formalism 8 6
Constant -1.08 0.41 0.31 0.25
Percent of judges on
council 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.10
Strong powers of
council 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.05
Common law dummy .22* -0.16** 0.18 0.16
GDP per capita .01*** .01* .00*** .01*
R2  .78 .23 .45 .19
= significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% confidence level;
significant at the 1% confidence level
The above results suggest the need to focus on a more dynamic
model of council structure. Clearly the effects are not linear. Rather,
there is a complex relationship between council structure and politi-
cal incentives of the various actors at the time of adoption. Ideally, we
would be able to model the decision to adopt a judicial council as a
product of the political factors we identify. However, we face two
daunting data challenges that prevent us from specifying such a
model. First, we would need comprehensive data on the judicial ap-
pointment systems of all countries, including those without a council,
82. Data on file with authors.
83. World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2006, available at http:fl
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/O,,content
MDK:20771165-menuPK: 1866365-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309-theSitePK: 1
740530,00.html.
84. See supra note 81.
85. See Howard & Carey, supra note 79
86. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project, CEPR Discussion
Papers 3344 (2002).
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before and after the adoption. Although Hanssen was able to gather
some such data in the United States, we have found no comparable
sources across a large number of countries.8 7 Second, we would need
refined indicators of political variation across countries over time. We
are not convinced that any one indicator would serve as an ideal
proxy for the myriad conditions that lead countries to adopt judicial
councils. Our preliminary conclusion, then, is that there is no evi-
dence that judicial councils promote independence.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is a first examination of judicial councils, a relatively
new institution associated with attempts to enhance judicial indepen-
dence. We began by providing a comprehensive view of common-law
judicial appointment commissions and civil-law high judicial coun-
cils. We have argued that the different designs aim at achieving the
appropriate balance between independence and accountability in the
face of two recurrent phenomena: the politicization of the judiciary
and the judicialization of politics. We provide a typology of judicial
councils by looking at two crucial elements, composition and compe-
tences, and test their interactions.
Our empirical observation of patterns of institutional design
show that competence and composition interact in complex ways to
respond to particular institutional problems. We also found little evi-
dence in favor of the widespread assumption that councils increase
quality or independence in the aggregate. Therefore, we emphasize
the complexity of the role of a judicial council and reject the simplistic
view that importing or transplanting certain types of judicial council
is likely to have a decisive impact on the quality of the judiciary. We
thus reject the view of international organizations that assert that
judges should always and everywhere form the majority of members
on the Council.88
Our framework also explains why it is that councils persist as
institutions. Because they involve actors from multiple different are-
nas, the council itself promises that no one institution can easily
dominate the judiciary. The councils, once created, provide an arena
for competition and the eternal struggle to calibrate independence
and accountability. We thus predict that councils themselves will fre-
quently become the targets of institutional reform, as examples from
Italy, Brazil and elsewhere demonstrated.8 9 We also can understand
87. Cf. Hannsen, supra note 47.
88. Autheman & Elena, supra note 26.
89. Autheman & Elena, supra note 26, provide a very interesting report of survey
data from five Central American countries. Respondents in those countries that had a
judicial council reported that the Council had had a negative impact on judicial inde-
pendence. Respondents in those countries that did not have a judicial council felt that
adopting a judicial council would increase judicial independence. Id. at 4. These two
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why they have been widely adopted, notwithstanding little support
for claims that they enhance independence: councils allow a wide
number of stakeholders to participate in discussions of judicial
governance.
Finally, we introduce the notion of the politically accountable but
strong judiciary. In many ways, this ideal type is more desirable than
the conventional view that judicial independence is an unqualified
good. Those who emphasize judicial independence too often do not ar-
ticulate the need for accountability, which provides the crucial other
side of the proverbial coin.
These findings have important implications for the ongoing de-
bate on judicial appointments in the United States. Rather than
assume that merit commissions, the American counterpart to judicial
councils, always enhance independence, scholars should conduct
more thorough empirical research to understand the precise determi-
nants of independence and accountability. Our case studies suggest
that these determinants are highly context-specific and not suscepti-
ble to one-size-fits-all solutions.
results are not contradictory from our point of view. First, the two sets of countries
have different starting places and are likely to vary systematically. Second, the coun-
tries that have adopted judicial councils may have done so to enhance accountability
rather than independence, in which case, respondents are observing a successful
institution.
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APPENDIX: DATA ON JUDICIAL COUNCILS
Country Number of Members Proportion of Judges
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Costa Rica
Cote D'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Democratic Republic of
Congo
Dominica
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
France
Gabon
Gambia
Guatemala
Ghana
Greece
Guyana
Hungary
Indonesia
Iraq
Israel
Italy/Sardinia
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
15 0.67
0.47
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3
3
2
3
2
3
3
2
3
2
3
2
2
3
1
3
2
3
3
3
2009] JUDICIAL COUNCILS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 133
Kenya 5 0.6 3
Kuwait
Latvia 3
Lebanon 15 0.53
Lesotho 4 0.25 3
Lithuania 3
Macedonia 7 0 3
Madagascar 1
Malawi 3
Malaysia 2 0
Mali 2
Malta 10 0.5 2
Marshall Islands 3 0.33 3
Mauritius 4 0.5 2
Mexico 4 1 3
Moldova 11 0.55 3
Mongolia 2
Morocco 0.86 2
Mozambique 16 0.56 2
Namibia 4 0.25 2
Nepal 5 0.6 3
Niger
Nigeria 3 1 2
Pakistan 5 1
Palau 7 0.14
Panama 8 0.63 1
Papua New Guinea 5 0.4
Paraguay 8 0.13 2
Peru 7 0.14 2
Philippines 0.22 2
Poland 15 2
Portugal 17 0.47 3
Republic of Congo 3
Romania 19 0.79 3
Rwanda 1 2
Saint Vincent 2
Samoa 3 0.33 3
Senegal 2
Seychelles 3 0 2
Sierra Leone 4 0.5 2
Singapore 6 0.4 3
Slovakia 3
Slovenia 11 0.55 2
Solomon 4 0.25 2
Somalia 2
South Africa 23 0.13
Spain 22 0.59
SriLanka 3 1 3
Sudan 1
Syria 3
Tajikistan 0 2
Tanzania 6 0.5 3
Thailand 15 0.87 3
Togo 9 0.78 3
Trinidad 0.4 3
Tunisia
Turkey 7 0 3
Uganda 0 3
Ukraine 20 0.20 3
Uruguay 7 0.43 3
Vanuatu 4 0.25 2
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Venezuela 8 0.5 3
Zambia 3
Zimbabwe 6 0.17 2
Key: Power Index has value 1 for purely administrative functions, value 2 for involvement
in appointments, and value 3 for roles in both appointment and discipline, removal or
promotion of judges.
